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Abstract
Standard models of intertemporal choice assume that individuals
discount future payoffs by integrating reward amounts and time delays
to generate a discounted value. Alternative models propose that, rather
than integrate across them, individuals compare within attributes
(amounts and delays) to determine if differences in one attribute
outweigh differences in another attribute. For instance, Leland (2002)
and Rubinstein (2003) propose models that 1) compare the two
reward amounts to determine whether they are similar, 2) compare the
similarity of the two time delays, and then 3) make a decision based on
these similarity judgments. Here, I tested discounting models against
attribute-based models that use similarity judgments to make choices. I
collected intertemporal choices and similarity judgments for the reward
amounts and time delays from participants in three experiments. All
experiments tested the ability of discounting and similarity models to
predict intertemporal choices. Model generalization analyses showed
that the best predicting models started with similarity judgments and
then, if similarity failed to make a prediction, resorted to discounting
models. Similarity judgments also matched intertemporal choice
data demonstrating both the magnitude and sign effects, thereby
accounting for behavioral data that contradict many discounting
models. These results highlight the possibility that attribute-based
models such as the similarity models provide alternatives to discounting
that may offer insights into the process of making intertemporal choices.
Word count: 8531
Keywords: attribute-based decisions, intertemporal choice, process
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Introduction1
Which would you prefer, a piece of cake now or a slimmer waist next week? How2
about $100 today or $105 in one year? Intertemporal choices (Frederick, Loewenstein,3
& O’Donoghue, 2002; Read, 2004; Stevens, 2010) such as these underlie the most4
pressing decisions we have to make, from addressing global climate change (Stern,5
2008) and the war on obesity (Komlos, Smith, & Bogin, 2004) to consuming alcohol6
(Rachlin, 2000) and investing in retirement plans (Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman,7
1998). In all of these cases, we must make decisions about future outcomes. Despite8
extensive interest in this topic, a critical gap remains in our knowledge of how we9
make intertemporal choices.10
For the last 75 years, the standard models of intertemporal choice assume11
that we temporally discount (i.e., subjectively devalue) the future when given the12
choice between a smaller reward available sooner and a larger reward available later.13
An alternative approach, however, suggests other means by which we can make14
these decisions. Rather than integrate attributes to generate a discounted value for15
each option, these models compare attributes (reward amounts and time delays) to16
determine if differences in one attribute outweigh differences in another attribute17
(Leland, 2002; Rubinstein, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2010; Vlaev, Chater, Stewart,18
& Brown, 2011). Here, I explore whether attribute-wise decision making can provide19
a viable alternative or supplement to discounting.20
Temporal Discounting21
The temporal discounting approach typically offers an ‘as-if’ model of decision22
making (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010; Kacelnik, 1997) rather than an explicit model of23
the process of decision making (but see Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Discounting models24
usually assume that individuals generate a subjective value for rewards discounted25
by the time delay to receiving the rewards and choose the option with the highest26
discounted value. For instance, in the previous monetary example, people often treat27
the $105 in one year as worth less than $105 today because they must wait for it.28
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So, while the present value of the immediate option remains $100, the present value29
of the delayed option decreases. Discounting models can make functional sense if a30
future benefit is uncertain. Typically, the farther in the future a benefit occurs, the31
lower the probability of it actually being realized. Therefore, future rewards should32
have a lower expected value. The form of these “hazard functions” of environmental33
uncertainty should map onto the discounted value functions (Kacelnik, 1997; Sozou,34
1998; Stephens, 2002). Though dozens of discounting models exist (Doyle, 2013),35
I focus on a handful of the most commonly discussed models (Table 1).36
Table 1
Intertemporal Choice Models
Models Choose Larger, Later if...
Exponential Ale
−δtl > Ase−δts
Hyperbolic (Mazur) Al1+ktl >
As
1+kts
Hyperbolic (Rachlin) Al1+ktσ
l
> As1+ktσs
Hyperbolic (Kirby) Al1+kAµ
l
tl
> As1+kAµs ts
Hyperbolic (Loewenstein & Prelec) Al(1+αtl)β/α
> As(1+αts)β/α
Arithmetic Al − λtl > As − λts
Similarity ts and tl are similar but As and Al are dissimilar
Note. A represents reward amount; t represents time delay; δ, k, σ, µ, α, β, and λ represent model-specific
parameters; and subscripts s and l refer to the smaller, sooner and larger, later option, respectively. If
the inequality is reversed for the first five models, they predict choice for the smaller, sooner option. For
similarity, if As and Al are similar but ts and tl are dissimilar, it predicts choosing the smaller, sooner
option. If neither of these is satisfied, it either chooses randomly (Leland, 2002) or uses some other
criterion (Rubinstein, 2003).
The standard economic model of exponential discounting (Samuelson, 1937)37
assumes that discounted values should correspond to compound interest. Individuals38
should choose based on which option offers the best outcome should they borrow39
or lend money at the market interest rate (Read, 2004). Exponential discounting40
predicts that the present value of an option V decays at a constant rate: V = Ae−δt,41
where A represents reward amount, t represents time delay to receiving the reward,42
and δ represents a discount parameter. The discount parameter δ is a function of43
the discount rate ρ (δ = −ln(1 − ρ)), which describes how quickly value decreases44
over time. We would expect exponential discounting when the probability of losing a45
future reward is constant per unit time.46
Though mathematically elegant and economically intuitive, much of the47
experimental evidence in humans and other animals contradicts predictions of48
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exponential discounting (reviewed in Frederick et al., 2002). Psychologists developed49
the alternative notion of hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1975; Chung & Herrnstein,50
1967; Herrnstein, 1981; Rachlin, 1970), and Mazur (1987) formalized the current51
standard hyperbolic model: V = A1+kt , where k is a discounting parameter that52
scales the steepness of discounting or the degree of preference for immediate rewards.53
Whereas exponential discounting corresponds to compound interest in economic54
terms, hyperbolic discounting corresponds to simple interest (Read, 2004). This55
model successfully fits people’s discounting patterns, typically better than exponential56
models (Frederick et al., 2002; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991) because it includes57
a discount rate that decreases with delay rather than remaining constant. Studies58
differ in how they compare models, but typically they fit various models using non-59
linear least-squares regression and compare R2 values (Kirby & Marakovic´, 1995;60
McKerchar et al., 2009). Hyperbolic discounting consistently shows higher R261
values, usually by 1-4 percentages points. Hyperbolic discounting also allows for62
time inconsistency, in which individuals plan to exhibit self-control when it is in the63
future, but as temptation nears, they often choose impulsively. A snooze bar on64
alarm clocks provide an example of this. In the evening, we set the alarm to wake up65
early to get a fresh start on the day. But once the alarm goes off, we often hit the66
snooze bar, succumbing to the temptation of more sleep. Hyperbolic discounting is67
also related to rate-based models of choice developed in the behaviorist tradition of68
psychology (Chung & Herrnstein, 1967; Herrnstein, 1981) and the foraging theory69
tradition of evolutionary biology (Kacelnik, 1997; Stephens & Krebs, 1986). If an70
individual maximizes his/her intake rate (rewards per unit time), this will result in a71
hyperbolic form (though not necessarily Mazur’s specification). Mazur’s hyperbolic72
discounting model was originally designed to describe pigeon data with repeated73
intertemporal choices, an ideal situation for maximizing rate. Because hyperbolic74
discounting can account for these phenomena, it has historically been the standard75
model of intertemporal choice in psychology.76
The Mazur hyperbolic discounting model, however, tends to “overpredict77
subjective value at shorter delays, while underpredicting it at longer delays”78
(McKerchar et al., 2009). Researchers have modified the Mazur model by79
incorporating more parameters to better fit the data. Rachlin (2006) added an80
exponent σ to the time delay to better capture sensitivity to delay: V = A1+ktσ . This81
additional parameter improves fit by allowing a more flexible relationship between82
value and delay. Kirby (1997) included a parameterized amount in the denominator83
to capture how the discount rate is sensitive to the reward amount: V = A1+kAµt ,84
where µ represents the sensitivity of discount rate to amount. Loewenstein and Prelec85
(1992) provide another modification of the hyperbolic discounting model that includes86
Mazur’s hyperbolic model and the exponential model as special cases: V = A(1+αt)β/α .87
Despite its success in quantitatively fitting functional forms of data, a number88
of qualitative empirical findings contradict Mazur’s hyperbolic discounting model89
(reviewed in Frederick et al., 2002; Read, 2004). Here I focus on two such90
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“anomalies”: the magnitude effect and the sign effect. The magnitude effect occurs91
when participants’ purported rate of discounting decreases as the absolute magnitude92
of the rewards increases (Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Thaler, 1981).93
Thus, people choose the smaller, sooner option more when facing $1 today vs. $594
in one year compared to when facing $1,000 today vs. $5,000 in one year, even95
though the ratio of rewards is the same. This constant reward ratio is important96
because hyperbolic discounting (along with exponential discounting) predicts that97
an individual preferring $1 today over $5 in year will always choose the smaller,98
sooner reward if the delays are fixed and the reward ratio is constant. The sign effect99
occurs when the discounting rate changes depending on whether the intertemporal100
choices involve positive outcomes (gains) or negative outcomes (losses). In particular,101
participants tend to discount gains more than losses (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt,102
2006; Hardisty, Appelt, & Weber, 2013; Thaler, 1981), though some individuals103
reverse their preferences for losses, opting to advance rather than delay them (Yates &104
Watts, 1975). Hyperbolic discounting models with more parameters and nonlinear105
utility functions (e.g., Kirby, 1997; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) better fit the106
data and can allow for behavioral anomalies such as the magnitude and sign effects.107
Nevertheless, Mazur’s hyperbolic discounting model continues to dominate the field108
of intertemporal choice.109
The arithmetic discounting model1 provides an alternative to hyperbolic110
discounting that converts the time delay into “disutility” and subtracts it from111
the reward amount (Doyle, 2013): V = A − λt, where λ represents the112
discounting parameter. Doyle and Chen (2012) suggest that arithmetic discounting113
can outperform hyperbolic and exponential discounting.114
Attribute-based Models115
An alternative to discounting exists. The attribute-based approach (Payne,116
Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Scholten & Read, 2010; Vlaev et al., 2011) takes117
a completely different view than the discounting approach. Instead of integrating118
the reward amount and time delay attributes to create a discounted value for each119
option, attribute-based models propose that individuals compare the attributes across120
options. Each of the models uses a different technique, but the general idea is to121
compare the values within an attribute (small amount compared to large amount and122
short delay compared to long delay) and then evaluate whether one attribute drives123
1Killeen (2009) has developed a more elaborate version of this model (called the additive
discounting model) with nonlinear utility and time perception functions.
The tradeoff model (Scholten & Read, 2010) is an attribute-based model related to the arithmetic
discounting model. In a simplified version of the model, the tradeoff between the attributes is given as
κ[w(tl)−w(ts)] = v(Al)−v(As), where κ is a comparison parameter, w is a time-weighting function,
and v is a value-weighting function. When w and v are concave (due to diminishing sensitivity), the
model falls between the arithmetic discounting model and an attribute-based model. When w and
v are linear, however, this model reduces to the arithmetic discounting model used here.
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choice. For instance, these models would compare receiving $100 vs. $105 and waiting124
until today vs. one year and then assess whether the reward amount or time delay125
comparison (nor neither) determines choice.126
Attribute-based models have been developed for two primary reasons. First,127
the discounting models fail to account for a number of key empirical findings in the128
literature (Leland, 2002; Rubinstein, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2010). Second,129
they do not offer accounts of the psychological process of decision making. When130
Rubinstein (2003) proposed an attribute-based model for intertemporal choice, he131
suggested that the existing discounting accounts of choice did not match the intuition132
one has about the psychological process experienced in making these decisions. The133
advantage of the attribute-based models is that they offer a window into the process134
of decision making by making predictions about the order of obtaining and using135
information about the attributes. Further, Rubinstein asserts that“the decision maker136
uses a procedure that aims at simplifying the choice by applying similarity relations”137
(p. 1210). Thus, attribute-based accounts may offer cognitively simpler processes for138
making intertemporal choices by avoiding integrating across attributes and focusing139
on potentially simpler comparison within them.140
Leland (2002) and Rubinstein (2003) developed an alternative approach that141
examined the influence of similarity judgments on intertemporal choices. Here,142
similarity refers to the psychological distance between receiving the two reward143
amounts or between waiting the two time delays. The similarity models use the144
perceived similarity of the reward amounts and of the time delays to make a decision.145
The similarity model can be described by a decision tree:146
Amounts similar?
Delay similar?
Random or
other criterion
Smaller sooner
Delay similar?
Larger later Random or
other criterion
Yes
Yes No
No
Yes No
Similarity domain
147
If only one attribute is judged as similar, then ignore that attribute and decide based148
on the other. In the previous example, one might judge receiving $100 and $105149
to be quite similar, whereas waiting 0 days vs. 1 year as not similar. Using the150
similarity model, one would ignore the amount attribute since they are similar and151
choose based on the time delay, therefore opting for the sooner reward of $100 today.152
This can generate similar behavior to the discounting models but via very different153
decision processes.154
In situations in which either amounts or delays are judged as similar (inner two155
terminal branches of decision tree), I label this the similarity domain because the156
model makes a deterministic prediction in these circumstances. Two versions of this157
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model exist that differ in their behavior outside of the similarity domain, that is,158
when both attributes are either similar or dissimilar (outer two terminal branches of159
decision tree). In the Leland (2002) version, the model predicts choosing randomly160
when outside the similarity domain. The Rubinstein (2003) version asserts that161
another criterion must be used when outside of the similarity domain. Rubinstein,162
however, did not specify any other possible criteria, so this form of the model makes no163
predictions in these circumstances. Here, I add the discounting models as the second164
criterion for cases outside of the similarity domain. Thus, I present seven similarity165
models: Leland’s version with random choice outside of the similarity domain and166
six separate versions with the other models implemented outside of the similarity167
domain.168
Present Study169
The aim of the present study was to formally test discounting and similarity170
models of intertemporal choice. Thus far, the only data collected on the similarity171
model are Rubinstein’s (2003) critical tests. These critical tests, however, did not172
directly measure similarity judgments.173
This study offers competitive model selection tests of the similarity model using174
similarity judgments from participants. To test these models, I collected choice data175
for intertemporal choices. Unlike previous intertemporal choice studies, I provide176
generalization tests of predictive accuracy to offer a more robust test of models.177
Generalization tests fit one set of data and predict responses on a different set of178
data (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000; Marewski & Olsson, 2009). In addition, these179
experiments test whether the similarity model can account for two key anomalies180
associated with hyperbolic discounting: the magnitude effect and the sign effect.181
The combination of model generalization tests and anomaly tests provide converging182
methods to explore attribute-based models of intertemporal choice.183
Experiment 1: Testing Similarity and the Magnitude Effect184
The goals of the first experiment were to (1) compare the predictive accuracy185
of discounting models (exponential, hyperbolic, and arithmetic) to similarity-186
based models and (2) explore whether similarity-based models can account for the187
magnitude effect in intertemporal choice. To robustly compare the models, I first fit188
them to one set of data and then used generalization techniques to test the predictive189
accuracy of the models on a different set of data. To test the influence of similarity190
judgments on choice, I collected dichotomous similarity ratings from participants for191
pairs of reward amounts and pairs of time delays.192
I also test the magnitude effect—the fact that the discount rate changes with the193
magnitude of the reward (Green et al., 1997; Thaler, 1981). The magnitude effect is194
not predicted by exponential discounting or Mazur’s hyperbolic discounting. Here, I195
tested the magnitude effect by offering participants a series of questions in which the196
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short delay and long delay remained constant, but the small and large amounts varied197
(ranging from $2-18), though their ratio remained constant. The hyperbolic model198
predicts the same choice across these questions because the amount ratio is constant.199
The similarity model, in contrast, predicts different choices if similarity changes with200
the magnitude of the reward amounts.201
Methods202
Participants. In May 2009, I tested 64 participants (29 males and 35 females)203
with a mean±SD age of 25.8±3.0 (range 19-33) years, recruited from German204
universities via the Max Planck Institute for Human Development participant pool.205
They received e8 for participating in the experiment and earned an additional206
e7.30±2.44 (range e1-15), based on their choices in the experiment.207
Materials and procedure.208
Procedural overview. All materials were prepared in German. The209
experiment included three phases. The first two phases (binary choice phase and210
staircase phase) offered participants intertemporal choice questions between pairs211
of options. In the final phase (similarity judgment phase), participants rated the212
similarity of the reward amounts and time delays used in the previous intertemporal213
choice phases. Questions were presented using HTML forms with response buttons214
and are available in the Supplementary Materials.215
Before beginning the first phase, the computer program explained to216
participants that their choices determined their payoffs: The computer program would217
randomly select one of the intertemporal choice questions, and the participant would218
receive the option that they chose via bank transfer. Thus, the participants were219
incentivized to make choices reflecting their true preferences because they would220
actually receive the amount they chose after the appropriate time delay. At the221
end of the experiment, participants were shown the randomly selected intertemporal222
choice question and their choice for that question. They were given the option of223
accepting this outcome, or, if the outcome was delayed, they could opt for 85% of the224
amount in cash immediately. Participants did not know that they would receive this225
option while making the prior intertemporal choices or similarity judgments.226
Binary choice phase. The first phase consisted of a series of 87 questions227
offering binary choices between options with different reward amounts and time228
delays, ranging from e1-20 and 0-85 days (Table S1). All participants first229
experienced the same two practice questions before moving to the test questions,230
the order of which was randomized across participants.231
A subset of questions was designed to test the magnitude effect (Table S2).232
These questions had fixed short delays and long delays and a fixed ratio but different233
magnitudes of small amounts and large amounts. With these questions, a hyperbolic234
discounter would make the same choice across questions, assuming a consistent235
discount parameter k. I offered three blocks (with amount ratios of 0.50, 0.67,236
and 0.80) of six questions each. Within each block, three questions involved an237
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immediate short time delay, and three questions involved a delayed short time delay.238
For these questions, the ratio of amounts, ratio of delays, and difference between239
delays remained constant, with only the difference between amounts (and therefore240
amount magnitude) varying across questions.241
Staircase phase. In the second phase, blocks of intertemporal choice242
questions were presented using the staircase method. Staircase questions were243
presented in 20 blocks (plus 1 practice block) of 10 questions. For 17 of these blocks,244
the small amount varied incrementally from e1-10, while the large amount, short245
delay, and long delay remained constant. For example, we asked participants, “Which246
option would you prefer? e1 in 1 day or e10 in 6 days”, then “Which option would247
you prefer? e2 in 1 day or e10 in 6 days”. This continued until they reached “Which248
option would you prefer? e10 in 1 day or e10 in 6 days”. For 3 of the blocks the short249
delay varied incrementally from 9 to 0 days, while the small amount, large amount,250
and long delays remained constant. Order of presentation (ascending or descending251
amounts or times) influences discounting parameter estimates (Hardisty et al., 2013;252
Robles & Vargas, 2007) suggesting that adjusting amounts and adjusting delays could253
yield different parameter estimates, as well. Therefore, to reduce potential variance254
in the parameter estimation, the adjusting-delay data were not analyzed here; I only255
included the adjusting-amount data. Participants began this phase of the experiment256
with one block of 10 practice questions. The order of trials within a block always257
increased from e1-10, but the order of blocks was randomized across participants.258
Mean choice percentages are presented in Figure S1.259
Similarity judgment phase. In the final phase, participants made 60260
dichotomous similar/different distinctions between reward amounts (23 questions)261
and between time delays (37 questions): “Indicate whether you would rate the above262
amounts [delays] as similar or different”. All amount and delay pairs were drawn from263
but did not include all binary choice and staircase questions from the first two phases.264
Data analysis. I processed and analyzed the data using R statistical software2265
version 3.3.1 (R Development Core Team, 2014). Data and R code3 are available266
in the Supplementary Materials and will be posted on the IQSS Dataverse Network267
data repository (http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/).268
I used individual participants as the unit of analysis, so all measures of choice269
and similarity are calculated over the mean values of each participant. When270
comparing measures within a participant, I used within-subjects 95% confidence271
intervals (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008) to remove between-participant effects.272
2In addition to the core R program, I used the bbmle (Bolker & R Development Core Team, 2012),
car (Fox & Weisberg, 2011), epicalc (Chongsuvivatwong, 2012), foreach (Revolution Analytics &
Weston, 2014), Hmisc (Harrell, with contributions from Charles Dupont, & many others, 2014),
lattice (Sarkar, 2008), latticeExtra (Sarkar & Andrews, 2013), plyr (Wickham, 2011), xtable (Dahl,
2013), and zoo (Zeileis & Grothendieck, 2005) packages.
3The original LATEX document, with Sweave-embedded R code (Leisch, 2002) to allow
reproduction of analyses (de Leeuw, 2001), is available from the author.
INTERTEMPORAL SIMILARITY 9
Model selection. I first fit the exponential discounting, hyperbolic273
discounting, and arithmetic discounting models to each participant’s staircase data274
using maximum likelihood estimation with an inverse logit function and a binomial275
distribution (median parameter estimates available in Table S3). I removed from276
the analysis participants whose maximum likelihood estimates failed to converge277
(typically due to nearly exclusive choice of the larger, later option), yielding data278
from 51 participants. To report fit for these models, I include AICc values (Burnham279
& Anderson, 2010) computed both over all data and separately for each participant.280
The similarity models had no parameters to fit for this analysis.281
Next, I used the fitted parameters from each model to predict responses for282
binary choice questions. I generated a prediction for each binary choice question,283
using participant-specific parameters estimated from the staircase data. For each284
participant and each model, I calculated predictive accuracy as the percentage of285
questions for which the model correctly predicted the participant’s choice.286
I used the dichotomous similarity ratings as the input into the similarity model.287
The 60 similarity judgments did not cover all attribute pairs, allowing the similarity288
models to make predictions for 46 of the 87 questions (53%). I restricted the289
model selection analysis to this subset of questions to allow a similar comparison290
across all models. I tested seven forms of the similarity model. Leland’s (2002)291
version of the model chose randomly when both attributes were judged as similar or292
dissimilar (outside of the similarity domain). Predictive accuracy for a participant was293
calculated as the mean predictive accuracy of the deterministic predictions and of the294
random predictions, weighted by the number of questions in each of those categories4.295
The remaining six similarity models employed the discounting models when outside296
the similarity domain. Thus, they were two-stage models with a similarity judgment297
stage and, if similarity did not make a deterministic prediction, a second stage used298
another model. The mean percentage of questions in the similarity domain for299
participants was 62% (median: 64%), ranging from 4-100%.300
Results and Discussion301
Model selection. Table 2 shows the mean AICc values (lower is better302
fit) and predictive accuracy (higher is better performance) for all models tested303
4Predictive accuracy was measured by assessing whether data matched the deterministic
predictions of the models. For random predictions, the expected predicted choice was 50% since
individuals were randomly choosing between two options. Therefore, for each participant, I
calculated the percent choice for the larger, later option in the questions for which the similarity
model predicted random choice (separately for both similar and both dissimilar). I then measured
the absolute deviation of the observed choice percentage from the expected percentage (50) and
divided by the expected percentage:
predictive accuracy = 1− |observed− 50|50 .
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in Experiment 1. Rachlin’s two-parameter hyperbolic discounting model best fit304
the aggregated data, and arithmetic discounting best fit the individual data. Yet,305
when predicting new data, all discounting models performed about equally well,306
predicting 70.5-74.2%. The two-stage similarity models, however, outpredicted the307
discounting models with a predictive accuracy of 77.0-79.2%. As an exploratory308
analysis, I compared the single-parameter hyperbolic model (Mazur) to the matching309
two-stage similarity model (similarity+Mazur). I chose Mazur’s model because it310
performed as well as all other models, offers parsimony with a single parameter, and311
is the standard model used in intertemporal choice. The two-stage model significantly312
outperformed the discounting only model by 7.0±3.1 percentage points, a medium-313
sized effect (Cohen’s d = 0.63). With the exception of Leland’s model, all of the314
two-stage similarity models performed at fairly comparable levels and better than315
the discounting models. Figure 1 shows boxplots of individual participant predictive316
accuracy to illustrate the variation in accuracy across models.317
Table 2
Model Selection Results for Experiment 1
Model Aggregate AICc Individual AICc Predictive Accuracy
Exponential 6265.6 62.1 71.7±2.3
Hyperbolic (Mazur) 6096.1 62.5 72.2±2.4
Hyperbolic (Rachlin) 5989.6 60.3 70.5±2.8
Hyperbolic (Kirby) 6078.7 62.4 73.1±2.1
Hyperbolic (Loewenstein & Prelec) 5992.9 61.3 72.1±2.8
Arithmetic 6451.4 60.2 74.2±1.8
Similarity (Leland) NA NA 69.4±7.3
Similarity+exponential NA NA 79.0±1.5
Similarity+Mazur NA NA 79.2±1.6
Similarity+Rachlin NA NA 77.7±1.7
Similarity+Kirby NA NA 78.2±1.6
Similarity+L&P NA NA 78.7±1.5
Similarity+arithmetic NA NA 77.0±1.7
Note. Aggregate AICc values are calculated using all staircase data. Individual AICc values are
the median AICc values calculated separately for each participant. Predictive Accuracy is the
mean percentage (± within-subjects 95% confidence intervals) of correctly predicted binary choice
data calculated over all participant means. Best fitted or predicted models for each measure are in
boldface. NA refers to the fact that the similarity models are not fitted to staircase data. Data are
based on 51 participants.
Leland’s (2002) similarity model had the lowest mean predictive accuracy318
of all models at 69.4%, though this was comparable to the discounting models.319
As illustrated in Figure 1, Leland’s similarity model included a large number of320
participants for whom it had very low predictive accuracy. Many participants were321
clearly not choosing randomly outside of the similarity domain, and the model322
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was severely penalized by them in terms of overall predictive accuracy. This323
similarity+random choice model, however, performed as well as the discounting324
models.325
When restricting the model selection analysis only to questions within the326
similarity domain, the models resulted in the following predictive accuracies:327
exponential discounting 64.2%, Mazur hyperbolic discounting 64.9%, Rachlin328
hyperbolic discounting 63.3%, Kirby hyperbolic discounting 69.1%, Loewenstein329
and Prelec hyperbolic discounting 65.0%, arithmetic discounting 76.8%, similarity330
85.7%. Thus, when it could make a deterministic prediction, the similarity model331
outperformed all other models.332
Magnitude effect. To test the magnitude effect, I varied the amount333
magnitude, while holding the amount ratio, short delay, and long delay within334
a block constant for both similarity judgments and choice. To test whether the335
similarity model predicts different choices within a block, I examined how the336
similarity ratings of reward amounts varied at different reward magnitudes. Increasing337
amount magnitudes reduced similarity judgments (Figure 2a), predicting an increase338
in choosing the larger, later options in intertemporal choice. As predicted by the339
similarity judgments, actual choices for the larger, later option increased as the340
amount magnitude increased (Figure 2b). Mazur’s hyperbolic discounting predicts341
similar choices (i.e., a flat line) across these magnitudes. Therefore, these findings342
contradict Mazur’s hyperbolic discounting but are consistent with predictions of343
the similarity model, suggesting that similarity could underly the magnitude effect344
observed here.345
Experiment 2: Testing Similarity without the Magnitude Effect346
The goal of the second experiment was to test whether the superior predictive347
accuracy observed in the similarity model in Experiment 1 was only due to its ability348
to account for the magnitude effect. To test this, I controlled for the magnitude effect349
by holding both the amounts and the k parameter values at indifference constant.350
I then varied only the delay magnitudes to determine whether similarity judgments351
tracked delays and continued to outperform the discounting models.352
Methods353
Participants. In December 2014, I tested 62 participants (23 males and354
39 females) with a mean±SD age of 20.1±3.5 (range 18-45) years, recruited355
from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Department of Psychology undergraduate356
participant pool. Participants received one course credit rather than money for their357
participation.358
Materials and procedure. This experiment was conducted using the web-359
based Qualtrics Survey Software and included five phases. The first phase presented a360
set of 31 binary choice questions (plus two practice questions). I restricted the analysis361
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here to questions with a small amount of $7, which resulted in 25 questions (Figure362
S5). Results were the same when including the six questions with small amount of363
$8. All questions had small amounts of $7 and large amounts of $10. Questions364
had k parameters at indifference of 0.333, 0.5, 0.6, 0.75, and 1.0. However, I varied365
the magnitude of the time delays from 18-309 days. I chose delays that would act366
as critical tests that result in different predictions for the hyperbolic and similarity367
models. In particular, given the k parameters, most participants should choose the368
larger, later option for all questions if they are hyperbolically discounting. However,369
the similarity model predicts choosing the smaller, sooner option in most of these370
questions because the amounts would likely be rated as similar but the delays rated371
as dissimilar.372
The second phase included a set of staircase choice questions consisting of eight373
blocks of 10 questions in which the small amount varied from $1-10, while the large374
amount ($10), short delay (0 days), and long delay remained constant within a block.375
Across blocks, the long delay varied between 2, 7, 14, 30, 60, 90, 180, and 365376
days, with the order of presentation randomized across participants. Mean choice377
percentage for binary choice data are presented in Table S5 and staircase data are378
presented in Figure S2.379
The next two phases measured similarity judgments. Participants judged the380
similarity of receiving monetary rewards (e.g., “Would you rate receiving $1 or $10381
as similar or different?”) and then the similarity of waiting (e.g., “Would you rate382
waiting 0 days or 2 days as similar or different?”). The amount and time delay values383
used in the similarity judgments included all values used in the intertemporal choices.384
The final phase collected demographic information, including age, gender, university385
major, ethnicity, employment status, number of children, and parental income.386
Data analysis. Data are available as supplementary materials. As in387
Experiment 1, for the model selection analysis, I removed participants whose388
maximum likelihood estimates did not converge. This yielded data from 54389
participants. From these participants, I calculated predictive accuracy for all models.390
Results and Discussion391
Participants chose the larger, later option less as the overall delay magnitude392
increased, even when amount magnitude and k values were held constant (Figure S3).393
This is not predicted by Mazur’s hyperbolic discounting model. As demonstrated with394
the amount magnitude effect in Experiment 1, the similarity judgments for these same395
delay pairs matched the choice proportions in the intertemporal choice questions,396
again suggesting that choices mirror similarity judgments (Figure S3).397
To test whether similarity judgments are not only consistent with choice but398
consistent with the use of the similarity model, I calculated predictive accuracy for399
all models using this data. Table 3 and Figure 3 show that similarity models greatly400
outpredict discounting models alone. Similarity+Mazur discounting outpredicts401
Mazur discounting alone by 23.0±11.0 percentage points, a medium-sized effect402
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(Cohen’s d = 0.57). Therefore, similarity outpredicts discounting alone because it403
accounts for magnitude effects in both amounts and delays.404
Table 3
Model Selection Results for Experiment 2
Model Aggregate AICc Individual AICc Predictive Accuracy
Exponential 4886.8 32.5 52.9±7.8
Hyperbolic (Mazur) 4323.8 27.4 42.4±7.4
Hyperbolic (Rachlin) 3894.6 26.1 43.9±6.6
Hyperbolic (Kirby) 4323.8 30.8 42.1±7.2
Hyperbolic (Loewenstein & Prelec) 3890.2 24.7 42.4±7.1
Arithmetic 6361.9 45.1 48.3±6.2
Similarity (Leland) NA NA 55.6±14.1
Similarity+exponential NA NA 68.4±7.1
Similarity+Mazur NA NA 65.3±5.7
Similarity+Rachlin NA NA 64.9±5.6
Similarity+Kirby NA NA 64.5±5.7
Similarity+L&P NA NA 64.1±5.7
Similarity+arithmetic NA NA 67.2±5.2
Note. Aggregate AICc values are calculated using all staircase data. Individual AICc values are
the median AICc values calculated separately for each participant. Predictive Accuracy is the
mean percentage (± within-subjects 95% confidence intervals) of correctly predicted binary choice
data calculated over all participant means. Best fitted or predicted models for each measure are in
boldface. NA refers to the fact that the similarity models are not fitted to staircase data. Data are
based on 54 participants.
Experiment 3: Testing Similarity and the Sign Effect405
The goals of the third experiment were to (1) replicate key model selection406
results from Experiment 1 and (2) explore whether similarity-based models can407
account for the sign effect in intertemporal choice. This experiment allowed408
confirmatory tests of the exploratory analyses comparing Mazur’s hyperbolic model409
and the two-stage similarity model with Mazur’s hyperbolic discounting. This tested410
whether adding similarity as the first step robustly improves the predictive accuracy411
of the Mazur hyperbolic model. As in Experiment 1, I first fit the hyperbolic models412
to one set of data and then tested the predictive accuracy of the models on a different413
set of data.414
To test the sign effect, I offered participants a series of intertemporal choices in415
which they would receive money after a delay (gain condition) or pay money after a416
delay (loss condition). I then asked them to judge the similarity of receiving monetary417
amounts, paying monetary amounts, and waiting for time delays. This allowed me418
to map similarity judgments for gains and losses on to the intertemporal choices for419
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gains and losses, thereby testing whether the similarity model can account for the420
sign effect.421
Methods422
Participants. From September to October 2013, I tested 68 participants (14423
males and 54 females) with a mean±SD age of 19.8±2.8 (range 17-39) years, recruited424
from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Department of Psychology undergraduate425
participant pool. Participants received one course credit rather than money for their426
participation.427
Materials and procedure. This experiment was conducted using Qualtrics428
Survey Software and included eight phases. The first two phases presented a set of429
40 binary choice questions from Luhmann (2013) (plus two practice questions). The430
second phase included a set of staircase choice questions consisting of six blocks (plus431
1 practice block) of 10 questions in which the small amount varied from $1-10, while432
the large amount ($10), short delay (0 days), and long delay remained constant within433
a block. Across blocks, the long delay varied between 2, 7, 14, 30, 60, and 90 days,434
with the order of presentation randomized across participants. For both phases, the435
questions were phrased as hypothetical gains (e.g., Would you prefer to RECEIVE436
$47 in 30 days or $58 in 80 days?). The third and fourth phases consisted of sets437
of the same binary and staircase questions in which the amounts were hypothetical438
losses (e.g., Would you prefer to PAY $47 in 30 days or $58 in 80 days?). Mean choice439
percentage for binary choice data are presented in Table S4 and staircase data are440
presented in Figures S4 and S5.441
The next three phases measured similarity judgments. Participants judged the442
similarity of receiving monetary gains (e.g., “Would you rate RECEIVING $1 or $10 as443
similar or different?”), the similarity of paying monetary losses (e.g., “Would you rate444
PAYING $1 or $10 as similar or different?”), and then the similarity of waiting (e.g.,445
“Would you rate WAITING 0 days or 2 days as similar or different?”). The amount446
and time delay values used in the similarity judgments included all values used in the447
intertemporal choices. The final phase collected demographic information, including448
age, gender, university major, ethnicity, employment status, number of children, and449
parental income.450
Data analysis. Data are available as supplementary materials. For the model451
selection analysis, I removed participants whose maximum likelihood estimates did452
not converge. This yielded data from 57 participants for the gain condition and 28453
participants for the loss condition.454
Thirty-nine of the forty participants that were dropped in the loss condition455
almost always chose the smaller, sooner option, and one participant almost always456
chose the larger, later option (Figure S5). This likely occurred because some457
participants prefer losses to be advanced while other prefer them to be delayed (Yates458
& Watts, 1975). I tested this by measuring choice in the staircase questions in which459
both options had the same amount ($10) but at different delays. Each participant460
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experienced six of these questions (one for each staircase block), and I categorized461
each participant as preferring losses (1) advanced if they chose the sooner option four462
or more times, (2) delayed if they chose the later option four or more times, and463
(3) neutral if they chose both options equally often. Whereas in the gain condition,464
66 of 68 participants advanced gains (with the other two being neutral), in the loss465
condition, 35 advanced losses and 31 delayed losses, roughly matching the even split466
shown by Yates and Watts (1975). Moreover, in the loss condition, 28 of the 40467
dropped participants (70%) were categorized as preferring advanced losses compared468
to 7 of the 28 retained participants (25%). Advancing losses implies a negative469
discount rate. Therefore, the drop in participants in the loss condition seems to470
result from a high number of participants with negative discount rates, which the471
stimuli were not designed to detect.472
Results and Discussion473
Replication. For the model selection replication, I used only the gain474
condition data to provide the clearest comparision to Experiment 1. As in Experiment475
1, the two-stage similarity models yielded higher predictive accuracy than the476
discounting models alone (Table 3). Mazur’s hyperbolic model correctly predicted477
65.6±2.0% of the gain binary choice data, and the two-stage similarity+Mazur model478
correctly predicted 68.7±2.1% of the data. Therefore, confirmatory analysis indicates479
that adding the similarity assessment before discounting significantly improved480
predictive accuracy by 3.1±1.8 percentage points, a small effect size (Cohen’s d =481
0.45). This benefit likely results from the high predictive accuracy of 86.8% for482
the similarity model in the similarity domain. This result replicates the findings483
of Experiment 1 despite testing in different countries (Germany vs. U.S.), different484
payment schemes (performance-based pay vs. hypothetical rewards), and different sex485
ratios (even vs. skewed toward females). Thus, the similarity model provides robust486
predictive accuracy over discounting models alone.487
Sign effect. To investigate whether the similarity model can account for488
the sign effect, I conducted the previously described model selection analysis on489
the loss data. Table 3 shows that all models, except Leland’s similarity model490
performed at comparable levels. Notably, the similarity models provided the same491
predictive accuracy as the discounting models. Mazur’s hyperbolic model correctly492
predicted 68.3±4.2% of the loss binary choices, and the two-stage similarity model493
with Mazur hyperbolic discounting predicted a comparable 67.5±4.5%. Therefore,494
though similarity models do not outperform discounting models in the loss domain,495
they perform equally well, thereby accounting for the sign effect as well as discounting496
models.497
To more thoroughly explore the sign effect, I calculated discount rates for both498
the gain and loss data. Because the previously described analyses on gain and499
loss data are based on different sets of participants (57 participants for the gain500
condition and 28 participants for the loss condition), I restricted this analysis to only501
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Table 4
Model Selection Results for Experiment 3
Gain Loss
Model Aggregate
AICc
Individual
AICc
Predictive
Accuracy
Aggregate
AICc
Individual
AICc
Predictive
Accuracy
Exponential 2879.0 22.1 66.6±2.8 2881.8 27.5 68.4±4.0
Hyperbolic (Mazur) 2701.7 21.2 65.6±2.0 2798.5 25.3 68.3±4.2
Hyperbolic (Rachlin) 2546.8 18.1 61.4±2.6 1903.0 19.7 68.1±3.7
Hyperbolic (Kirby) 2701.7 22.3 55.5±2.8 2798.5 25.9 67.1±3.5
Hyperbolic (L&P) 2533.0 23.7 52.4±3.6 2420.7 19.1 65.6±3.6
Arithmetic 3120.4 21.4 43.9±3.7 2965.9 30.5 64.4±7.1
Similarity (Leland) NA NA 64.0±7.4 NA NA 42.1±17.7
Similarity+exponential NA NA 70.2±2.4 NA NA 68.3±3.5
Similarity+Mazur NA NA 68.7±2.1 NA NA 67.5±4.5
Similarity+Rachlin NA NA 65.9±2.1 NA NA 68.6±2.6
Similarity+Kirby NA NA 61.7±2.2 NA NA 67.9±2.9
Similarity+L&P NA NA 61.4±2.4 NA NA 66.5±2.8
Similarity+arithmetic NA NA 55.4±3.7 NA NA 66.5±5.7
Note. Aggregate AICc values are calculated using all staircase data. Individual AICc values are
the median AICc values calculated separately for each participant. Predictive Accuracy is the mean
percentage (± within-subjects 95% confidence intervals) of correctly predicted binary choice data
calculated over all participant means. Best fitted or predicted models for each measure are in boldface.
NA refers to the fact that the similarity models are not fitted to staircase data. Data are based on 57
participants for the gain condition and 28 participants for the loss condition.
participants for whom I could calculate maximum likelihood estimates for both gain502
and loss data (i.e., the 28 participants from the loss condition). The discount rate503
for gains (ρ =0.016±0.001) significantly differs from that for losses (ρ =0.009±0.001),504
with steeper discounting for gains. This finding replicates previous work in the field505
demonstrating steeper discounting for gains compared to losses (Estle et al., 2006;506
Hardisty et al., 2013; Thaler, 1981). I also calculated the similarity ratings of the507
reward amounts for gains and losses in both binary and staircase intertemporal choice508
data. Participants judged the amounts as similar in 30% of gain amount pairs and509
28% of loss amount pairs, a significant difference of 2.2±2.0% with a small effect size510
(Cohen’s d = 0.26). Since amounts are judged as more similar for gains than losses,511
this suggests that participants will ignore amounts and focus on delays more for gains512
than losses. This emphasis on delays will favor choosing the smaller, sooner option513
more, which results in higher discount rates for gains. Thus, differences in similarity514
judgments match those observed in intertemporal choices, though replications with515
larger samples are needed to confirm reliability.516
A key limitation of interpreting the sign effect data is the fact that so many517
participants were dropped due to what appears to be negative discount rates for518
losses. Therefore, the analysis provided here applies to only a subset of decision519
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makers, most of which have positive discount rates. Though Yates and Watts (1975)520
showed clear individual differences in positive or negative discount rates for losses,521
little research has expanded on or even recognized the possibility of negative discount522
rates when fitting models to loss data. Future work must acknowledge this variation523
to fully capture intertemporal choice data.524
General Discussion525
In Experiment 1, the discounting models all predicted new data with roughly526
equal success. Yet, the two-stage similarity-based models provided the highest527
mean predictive accuracy rates, with comparable levels of performance across the528
different discounting models. Moreover, similarity judgments tracked differences in529
amount magnitude, consistent with the magnitude effect observed in intertemporal530
choices. In Experiment 2, similarity judgments tracked choices and the similarity531
model outpredicted discounting models even when the magnitude effect was removed.532
While holding reward amounts constant (thereby removing the magnitude effect),533
varying the delay magnitudes influenced choices consistent with predictions from the534
similarity model. In Experiment 3, a replication of Experiment 1 again showed that535
adding similarity improved predictive accuracy, as the two-stage similarity-hyperbolic536
(Mazur) model outpredicted the hyperbolic (Mazur) model alone for the gain data.537
The similarity model also accounted for the sign effect both by predicting choices538
framed as losses as well as the hyperbolic discounting model and by demonstrating539
that similarity judgments tracked the gain/loss difference observed in discount rates.540
Thus, model generalization tests and tests of anomalies provide converging evidence541
supporting attribute-based models of intertemporal choice, such as the similarity542
model, as viable alternatives or precursors to discounting models.543
Leland (2002) provided a similarity-based model of intertemporal choice that544
randomly chooses when similarity does not discriminate between attributes. This545
model is probably not an accurate model of choice given the random component546
of choice. In fact, this model cannot account for preference reversals5 observed in547
participant data (Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995). Yet,548
this simple model performed as well as discounting models for gain data. Viewing549
the distribution of participant accuracies suggests that this model yielded the largest550
range in predictive accuracies (Figure 1).551
In Rubinstein’s (2003) version of the similarity model, individuals are expected552
to use similarity to make a choice, and, if similarity does not distinguish, then use553
another criterion. Two-stage models of similarity were, in fact, quite successful in554
predicting participant choices. Models that start out using similarity models and555
5For example, the large amount is typically chosen over the small amount when both delays are
large. Preference reversals occur when choice switches from larger, later to the smaller, sooner option
as the delay decreases (holding amounts constant). Leland’s model would predict that choice should
switch from larger, later (because delays are similar) to random as delays decrease (because they
become more dissimilar).
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then use discounting models if similarity does not make a deterministic prediction556
outperformed all other models for gain data. This raises the intriguing possibility557
that people start out with an attribute-based strategy for intertemporal choice and558
then may switch to discounting or other strategies as a last resort.559
Though discounting models performed well as the second stage outside of the560
similarity domain, this does not imply that only discounting models are needed. In561
point of fact, if analysis is restricted to only questions found within the similarity562
domain for gains, the similarity model outperformed the next best models by 9-40563
percentage points. Therefore, when the similarity model can make a deterministic564
prediction, it predicts choice at a much greater level than any of the discounting565
models. This indicates that similarity adds a unique contribution to intertemporal566
choice beyond discounting for gains.567
For losses, similarity performed as well as but not better than discounting568
models. This may result from assessing delay similarity with a single set of judgments569
that did not discriminate between gains and losses. Including the gain and loss570
dimension for delay similarity judgments may further improve the accuracy of the571
similarity model in the loss domain.572
Most studies of intertemporal choice typically rely on nonlinear regression of573
choice data to discriminate between models (e.g., Green, Myerson, & Macaux, 2005;574
McKerchar et al., 2009). In these analyses, hyperbolic discounting usually does a575
good job of fitting data, as it did in these two experiments. To improve fit, modelers576
often add more parameters to the hyperbolic model (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992;577
Myerson & Green, 1995; Rachlin, 2006). Simply fitting models is problematic,578
however, because of the possibility of overfitting data (Pitt & Myung, 2002). Having579
more parameters allows a model to fit the noise in the data at the expense of580
capturing the overall relationship. One way to properly test the models and avoid581
overfitting is to predict new data (Marewski & Olsson, 2009). Though a common582
practice in machine learning and some areas of psychology, few if any studies of583
intertemporal choice use either cross validation (fitting a proportion of a single data584
set and predicting the rest; reviewed in Shiffrin, Lee, Kim, & Wagenmakers, 2009)585
or generalization (fitting one data set and predicting a different set; Busemeyer &586
Wang, 2000). This study used a generalization technique in intertemporal choice by587
fitting model parameters on the staircase data and measuring predictive accuracy on588
a different set of binary choice data.589
In both experiments, adding more parameters to the Mazur hyperbolic model590
(e.g., using the Rachlin, Kirby, and Loewenstein & Prelec models) typically improved591
fit of the gain data. In predictive accuracy, however, at best the multi-parameter592
hyperbolic models performed only as well as the single-parameter hyperbolic model593
(Tables 2 & 3), and, in some cases, the single-parameter model predicted better. In594
addition, when combined with the similarity models, the two-parameter discounting595
models did not increase predictive accuracy over the one-parameter version. These596
two findings supports the notion that high-parameter models can overfit the data,597
INTERTEMPORAL SIMILARITY 19
especially when they are not constructed to accommodate psychological processes.598
Therefore, the current practice of comparing intertemporal choice models based on599
model fitting does not translate well to predicting new data.600
Limitations and Future Directions601
One limitation of interpreting the results of these studies is that the predictive602
accuracies of many of the models was fairly similar (Tables 2 & 3). In Experiment 1,603
the discounting models performed quite similarly. For gains, similarity models yield604
accuracies 3-11 percentage points higher than discounting models alone, matching the605
differences typically used to distinguish between fits of exponential and hyperbolic606
models (Kirby & Marakovic´, 1995; McKerchar et al., 2009). Thus, including607
similarity increases predictive accuracy. However, within these two tiers of models608
(discounting alone and similarity+discounting), the models perform similarly. We609
need to design future experimental stimuli specifically for discriminating among610
these models to better understand the relative success of discounting and similarity611
models. Scholten, Read, and Sanborn (2014) designed their studies to discriminate612
among several discounting models and their tradeoff model, with time-weighting and613
value functions included for both model types. The attribute-based tradeoff model614
outperformed the Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) hyperbolic model. Further, Dai615
and Busemeyer (2014) demonstrated that an attribute-based diffusion model can616
outpredict discounting models when using probabilistic and dynamic specifications.617
Thus, we have evidence from multiple studies that attribute-based models can better618
account for intertemporal choices than discounting models. An obvious next step is619
to begin testing attribute-based models against each other.620
A limitation of the similarity model is that it lacks an explanation of the621
similarity judgment itself. It effectively pushes the explanatory question from the622
intertemporal choice to the similarity judgment. Thus, further refinements of the623
similarity model are needed to explore how individuals make similarity judgments for624
reward amounts and time delays. Rubinstein (1988), for instance, proposed that the625
ratio between rewards could drive similarity judgments. Though a nice start, this626
does not completely capture the nature of similarity judgments, because both ratios627
and differences influence similarity judgments for amounts and delays. Similarity628
judgments in models of choice clearly require more in-depth investigation.629
Both cognitive psychology and machine learning have a long history of exploring630
similarity concepts (Aha, Kibler, & Albert, 1991; Goldstone & Son, 2005; Hahn631
& Chater, 1998; Shepard, 1987; Tversky, 1977). At the moment, there does632
not appear to be much work on similarity in monetary rewards or time delays,633
though researchers have investigated the role of time estimation on intertemporal634
choice (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008; Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009).635
One key finding in the similarity literature is that context matters greatly. We636
would not expect people to rate $1 vs. $3 in the same way as they rate 1 cent vs.637
3 cents or 1 day vs. 3 days or 1 year vs. 3 years. In fact, each of these four pairs638
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could very well elicit different similarity ratings, despite sharing 1 vs. 3 in common.639
Moreover, even within identical magnitudes and currencies, data presented here show640
that gaining rewards vs. losing rewards are different contexts that influence similarity641
judgments. States such as an individual’s socio-economic status also likely shape642
similarity judgments: an undergraduate will judge the similarity of $100 and $200643
differently than a billionaire. Thus, contextual factors play a key role in similarity644
judgments, highlighting important open areas of research.645
As a further example of context effects, the pairing of the amounts and delays646
together in an intertemporal choice question may influence their similarity judgments.647
For example, $1 vs. $3 may be rated as more similar when paired with long delays than648
when paired with short delays, a phenomenon termed inseparability (Scholten & Read,649
2010). This interdependency suggests that the current estimates of accuracy for the650
similarity models are a lower bound because similarity was measured separately from651
choice. If similarity were measured concurrently with choice, the similarity model652
would likely perform even better.653
Understanding the contextual basis of similarity judgments could provide key654
insights into apparent violations of discounting model predictions. Many discounting655
models must change discount rates with not only the magnitude and sign of the reward656
but also the direction of the reward sequence (improving sequences are preferred over657
declining sequences) and the reward domain (monetary outcomes are discounted more658
steeply than health outcomes). Here, I demonstrate that similarity judgments can659
capture how the contexts of reward magnitude and sign influence intertemporal choice.660
This finding raises the possibility that similarity judgments may also account for other661
effects of context on intertemporal choices.662
In summary, similarity is highly context dependent. Yet, its context dependence663
offers a powerful test of the similarity model. We can make predictions about how664
the variation within and between individuals in similarity judgments will influence665
within- and between-individual variation in intertemporal choices. Combining the666
rich literature on similarity with process models of decision making could open667
new avenues of future research on the similarity model and the process of making668
intertemporal choices.669
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Figure 1 . Predictive accuracy of intertemporal choice models in Experiment 1. The mean
predictive accuracy per model varied across participants. Diamonds and error bars represent
mean and within-subjects 95% confidence intervals. Boxplots show median, interquartile
range, and range. Dashed line represents maximum predictive accuracy.
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Figure 2 . Tests of magnitude effect in Experiment 1. Each panel represents a block of
questions with same amount ratio. (a) For the Immediate questions, the short delay is
always 0 days (today). For the Delayed questions, the short delay ranges from 4-8 days.
The percentage of participants who rated the amounts as similar decreased as the large
reward magnitude increased. Similarity judgments were identical if the short delay was
immediate or delayed, so a single line is drawn. (b) Choice for the larger, later option in
the binary choices increased with the reward magnitude. Points and error bars represent
means and within-subjects 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3 . Predictive accuracy of intertemporal choice models in Experiment 2. The mean
predictive accuracy per model varied across participants. Diamonds and error bars represent
mean and within-subjects 95% confidence intervals. Boxplots show median, interquartile
range, and range. Dashed line represents maximum predictive accuracy.
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Supplementary Materials852
Table S1
Questions and Mean Responses for Experiment 1
Short delay Long delay Small amount Large amount Mean choice for LL Standard deviation
0 10 2 3 0.43 0.50
0 10 4 6 0.31 0.47
0 10 8 12 0.49 0.50
0 12 4 5 0.08 0.27
0 12 8 10 0.22 0.42
0 12 12 15 0.24 0.43
0 15 1 2 0.14 0.35
0 15 4 6 0.18 0.39
0 15 5 10 0.67 0.48
0 15 9 18 0.80 0.40
0 22 1 10 0.94 0.24
0 22 3 10 0.82 0.39
0 22 5 10 0.59 0.50
0 22 7 10 0.16 0.37
0 22 7 10 0.25 0.44
3 33 8 12 0.24 0.43
3 33 8 12 0.25 0.44
3 33 8 12 0.25 0.44
3 33 8 12 0.25 0.44
3 33 8 12 0.27 0.45
3 33 8 12 0.37 0.49
4 16 2 3 0.16 0.37
4 16 4 6 0.24 0.43
4 16 8 12 0.65 0.48
4 22 7 10 0.37 0.49
5 25 1 2 0.29 0.46
5 25 5 10 0.69 0.47
5 25 9 18 0.84 0.37
5 38 6 8 0.10 0.30
5 38 6 8 0.12 0.33
5 38 6 8 0.12 0.33
5 38 6 8 0.12 0.33
5 38 6 8 0.14 0.35
5 38 6 8 0.22 0.42
8 22 4 5 0.08 0.27
8 22 7 10 0.53 0.50
8 22 8 10 0.31 0.47
8 22 12 15 0.47 0.50
12 17 8 12 0.90 0.30
12 22 7 10 0.55 0.50
15 22 1 10 1.00 0.00
15 22 3 10 0.98 0.14
15 22 5 10 0.94 0.24
15 22 7 10 0.76 0.43
16 22 7 10 0.86 0.35
20 22 7 10 0.96 0.20
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Table S2
Magnitude Effect Questions for Experiment 1
Short Long Small Large Delay Amount
Delay Delay Amount Amount Delay Difference Amount Difference
(Days) (Days) (e) (e) k Ratio (days) Ratio (e)
0 15 1 2 0.07 0.00 15 0.50 1
0 15 5 10 0.07 0.00 15 0.50 5
0 15 9 18 0.07 0.00 15 0.50 9
5 25 1 2 0.07 0.20 20 0.50 1
5 25 5 10 0.07 0.20 20 0.50 5
5 25 9 18 0.07 0.20 20 0.50 9
0 10 2 3 0.05 0.00 10 0.67 1
0 10 4 6 0.05 0.00 10 0.67 2
0 10 8 12 0.05 0.00 10 0.67 4
4 16 2 3 0.05 0.25 12 0.67 1
4 16 4 6 0.05 0.25 12 0.67 2
4 16 8 12 0.05 0.25 12 0.67 4
0 12 4 5 0.02 0.00 12 0.80 1
0 12 8 10 0.02 0.00 12 0.80 2
0 12 12 15 0.02 0.00 12 0.80 3
8 22 4 5 0.02 0.36 14 0.80 1
8 22 8 10 0.02 0.36 14 0.80 2
8 22 12 15 0.02 0.36 14 0.80 3
Table S3
Median Parameter Estimates for Models
Model Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Gains Experiment 3 Losses
Exponential δ = 0.016 δ = 0.009 δ = 0.011 δ = 0.008
Hyperbolic (Mazur) k = 0.02 k = 0.01 k = 0.02 k = 0.01
Hyperbolic (Rachlin) k = 0.03, σ = 1.2 k = 0.05, σ = 0.76 k = 0.06, σ = 0.75 k = 0.13, σ = 0.55
Hyperbolic (Kirby) k = 0.07, µ = -0.59 k = 0.02, µ = -0.3 k = 0.05, µ = -0.56 k = 0.03, µ = -0.58
Hyperbolic (Loewenstein & Prelec) α = 0.04, β = 0.03 α = 0.08, β = 0.03 α = 45.55, β = 2.22 α = 2.71, β = 0.23
Arithmetic λ = 0.14 λ = 0.03 λ = 0.07 λ = -0.05
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Table S4
Questions and Mean Responses for Experiment 2
Short delay Long delay Small amount Large amount k Mean choice for LL Standard deviation
18 27 7 10 0.33 0.72 0.45
81 117 7 10 0.33 0.44 0.50
88 127 7 10 0.33 0.33 0.48
40 58 7 10 0.50 0.67 0.48
61 88 7 10 0.50 0.65 0.48
75 108 7 10 0.50 0.44 0.50
82 118 7 10 0.50 0.37 0.49
89 128 7 10 0.50 0.44 0.50
73 105 7 10 0.60 0.50 0.50
87 125 7 10 0.60 0.37 0.49
36 52 7 10 0.75 0.65 0.48
50 72 7 10 0.75 0.56 0.50
71 102 7 10 0.75 0.50 0.50
85 122 7 10 0.75 0.37 0.49
141 202 7 10 0.75 0.26 0.44
55 79 7 10 1.00 0.50 0.50
76 109 7 10 1.00 0.43 0.50
83 119 7 10 1.00 0.43 0.50
97 139 7 10 1.00 0.39 0.49
118 169 7 10 1.00 0.41 0.50
146 209 7 10 1.00 0.26 0.44
153 219 7 10 1.00 0.24 0.43
160 229 7 10 1.00 0.20 0.41
195 279 7 10 1.00 0.28 0.45
216 309 7 10 1.00 0.26 0.44
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Table S5
Questions and Mean Responses for Experiment 3
Short delay Long delay Small amount Large amount Choice LL (gain) SD (gain) Choice LL (loss) SD (loss)
0 20 32 55 0.58 0.50 0.21 0.42
0 20 40 70 0.86 0.35 0.21 0.42
0 25 40 55 0.39 0.49 0.46 0.51
0 40 25 35 0.18 0.38 0.36 0.49
0 50 30 85 0.74 0.44 0.11 0.31
10 20 10 18 0.61 0.49 0.29 0.46
10 25 15 35 0.77 0.42 0.14 0.36
10 27 40 65 0.56 0.50 0.11 0.31
10 30 30 35 0.09 0.29 0.36 0.49
10 30 40 62 0.49 0.50 0.61 0.50
10 35 25 34 0.21 0.41 0.36 0.49
10 37 21 30 0.16 0.37 0.57 0.50
10 37 65 75 0.14 0.35 0.39 0.50
10 40 67 85 0.35 0.48 0.46 0.51
10 65 45 70 0.33 0.48 0.50 0.51
10 85 21 30 0.04 0.19 0.46 0.51
20 25 10 12 0.46 0.50 0.36 0.49
20 27 20 26 0.47 0.50 0.18 0.39
20 37 27 30 0.12 0.33 0.64 0.49
20 40 32 45 0.53 0.50 0.36 0.49
20 43 34 35 0.04 0.19 0.61 0.50
20 50 47 60 0.28 0.45 0.86 0.36
20 50 83 85 0.02 0.13 0.54 0.51
20 65 48 55 0.07 0.26 0.57 0.50
20 85 30 35 0.05 0.23 0.46 0.51
30 37 10 12 0.33 0.48 0.14 0.36
30 37 20 24 0.40 0.49 0.25 0.44
30 37 48 55 0.70 0.46 0.29 0.46
30 40 15 19 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.46
30 50 32 43 0.33 0.48 0.25 0.44
30 55 40 50 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.44
30 60 32 55 0.60 0.49 0.75 0.44
30 60 53 55 0.02 0.13 0.32 0.48
30 65 16 24 0.18 0.38 0.25 0.44
30 70 16 30 0.44 0.50 0.39 0.50
30 70 24 55 0.58 0.50 0.18 0.39
30 70 50 80 0.46 0.50 0.29 0.46
30 80 47 58 0.19 0.40 0.50 0.51
30 85 53 55 0.04 0.19 0.68 0.48
30 100 50 74 0.21 0.41 0.39 0.50
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Figure S1 . Mean choice percentages for staircase data in Experiment 1. Participants
experienced three short delays and five long delays in the staircase phase of Experiment 1.
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Figure S2 . Mean choice percentages for staircase data in Experiment 2. Participants
experienced eight long delays in the staircase phase of Experiment 2.
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Figure S3 . Tests effect of delay in Experiment 2. Each panel represents a block of questions
with same k parameter at indifference. (a) The percentage of participants who rated the
delays as similar decreased as the short delay magnitude increased. (b) Choice for the
larger, later option in the binary choices decreased with the short delay magnitude. Points
and error bars represent means and within-subjects 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure S4 . Choice percentages for staircase data in Experiment 3 gain condition.
Participants experienced six long delays in the staircase phase of Experiment 3.
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Figure S5 . Choice percentages for staircase data in Experiment 3 loss condition.
Participants experienced six long delays in the staircase phase of Experiment 3.
